God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, uniqueness
the classical theological tradition supports the following propositions simultaneously :
(1)
God is omnipotent and
(2)
God is omniscient and
(3)
God is good, where "Good" with a capital letter stands for "infinitely good". These three assumptions it can add one:
(0)
There is only one God
are numerous confirmations in the text sacred
When Abram was ninety-nine years, the Lord appeared to him and said, "I am God Almighty
: walk before me and be blameless. (Genesis
17:1)
Do you know how the clouds hover in the air, the wonders of one who knows everything? (Job 37:16
)
good and right and the Lord, our God is merciful . (Psalms 115:5
)
For the Lord your God is a merciful God
; not abandon you and do not destroy thee, nor forget the covenant which he swore to your fathers. (
Deuteronomy 4:31)
But
one who knows everything, knows it and has scrutinized by intelligence. It is he who shall turn in times ruled the earth and filled it in animals. (Baruch 3:32
)
not multiply the speeches arrogant, arrogance does not come out of your mouth, because the Lord is the God who knows everything and his works are governed. (1 Samuel 2:3 )
have no other god but me. (Exodus 20:3) The term "omnipotent" means "anything that can, and can be attributed only to God (from dictionary), so anything imaginable can be made by God ( if someone believes that "anything" is not synonymous with "every conceivable thing," you can now reads: "at least every conceivable thing can be done by God," because in this case "everything thinkable" is a subset just "whatever"). At this point, postulating that (PA) there is a single entity called God of which (to borrow the terminology of St. Anselm) nothing can be more: (PA) ∃ x [R & ( ⌐
∃ z (z> x) & (y) (Dy
⇾ x = y))]
with D: "to be God."
for "greatest of all Board" means the entity that possesses all perfections, and intuitively, perfection is a desirable property the highest degree. Here is revealed with clarity throughout the arbitrariness on which the Saint Anselm's definition of God: the preferability implies, for example, feel better goodness to evil, life or death, but this requires a human to judge subjectively the best that can be said - namely, what is best for the judging
. And the fact that some people deem it preferable property does not mean that God possesses. The same Gödel, in his "mathematical proof of the existence of God," warns the problem, and speaks of "positive properties." However the issue remains unchanged: we have no yardstick to determine objectively as possible which property can be said and what is not positive, once again, the only yardstick is the human one, returning the properties to the same positive refutation of property preferable. But what is puzzling is what a property could ever be "the highest degree." It might be expected that all properties are crystallized into archetypes, and the objects according to the hierarchical proximity to these archetypes. Give now, mo 'for example, any color, brown. In nature there are various shades of brown, but no one can say with certainty Brown, it can happen then apply an agreement through which it is determined that "this here is brown. From that point on, you can prioritize all the bodies because of their proximity to the archetype established, which is brown in the highest degree. But what is considered "maximum", "archetype" has been established arbitrarily, that is, by men.
In summary, to say that God possesses all perfections support means that only the properties that people prefer and the way you determine which, euphemistically, is not very persuasive. a ploy to stem the problem is to consider the properties
eminentiori sensu (ie extended indefinitely), instead of "the highest degree." This will replace an unacceptable arbitrariness with something that no one understands the meaning, but justified by the fact that God is beyond human cognitive faculties. So, for example, well, controversial concept in itself, in God is an infinite good - even more controversial.
But now, flying over the property sull'inaccettabilitĂ positive or preferable, let's assume that God exists.
We know it can do anything you can imagine by virtue of his omnipotence. So it could be a dog or a plant. There are consequences more fatal, which would lead to absurd logic, such as the fact that (a)
God can not be himself or
(b) institution can create a "greater than he" (meaning Anselmo). To grasp the absurdity in all its glory, note the formalization of (a):
(a) ∃ x (Dx & (Y) (Dy
⇾
M
⌐ Dy & x = y))
with M = modal operator of possibility. For (b) applies instead: (b)
∃ x [R & (y) (z) (Dy
⇾
MCyz & x = y & z> x)]
where C = "create an entity".
A theologian may rightly place the emphasis on the operator is not truth-functional M: in fact this is only possible, and God could not do it. Theology tells us that in reality
(1st) exercise the omnipotence of God as an act of will
or whatever God wants he can do. Meanwhile, by (b) we note that there is at least the possibility that there is an even greater authority of God himself, call 2 God, but God 2, being greater than God, is even more powerful, and will certainly create a God 3, and so on to infinity. So we have an infinite number of potentials. So (b1) is possible that God exists at least one of n-th level created by one God of level n-1. This is a generalization of (b):
(b1) M ∃ x [D x & n ∃ y (n-1 D & y (z) (n-1 D z ⇾ SXZ & y = z & ⌐
x = y))]
= S "being created by".
Since humans can not know when and how God exercises his will (from (1a)), for (b1) we must correct the theologians and say that there is at least a God who could have created (not just more of him: divine entities may also create less than or equal to itself, resulting in a similar pantheon that described by the currents and the Gnostic Corpus Hermeticum):
(TNU) Theorem to potential non-uniqueness of God :
∃ x (Dx & MGxx)
where G = "create more institutions, equal to or less than."
The (TNU) contradicts the assumption (0): If God is omnipotent, we must admit that may not be the only God, but if we admit the uniqueness at all costs, we must recognize that may not be omnipotent.
But is not the only contradiction. We can ask if (1) God is able to do things that he himself does not know: if he can do it, then it is not omniscient, if it can not omnipotent. Even if such action would be potential omniscience would be compromised, since it would ignore the possibility.
Finally, the character of omnipotence includes the possibility of evil actions (this argument is known for millennia and has been properly resolved in different ways, with important modifications of the concept of God and Amalric, and Schelling), but from (3) we know that God is infinitely good, then God can not do evil. The fact remains that could do it as a possibility: but this is impossible, since God is essentially good. Since the Good can not do evil even in power, God can not do evil even in power. Therefore God is infinitely good, or is or omnipotent.
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