It was found that the Christian concept of God is contradictory, as is the idea of \u200b\u200ba miracle. But what are, ultimately, the contradictions? There are different types, which can be traced back to four (the last of which is problematic): syntactic, semantic, logical, metaphysical and psychological and pragmatic.
A contradiction of syntactic type is presented in this form:
1 - & δ ¬ δ
and is at the heart of any atomic, in propositional logic gives rise to the law of contradiction, that together with d other basic laws ( excluded middle, classical double negation, the negation introduction rule, introduction of the conjunction, and so on) is the cornerstone of logical demonstration. For example, here is the simple demonstration of the validity of modus tollens:
p ―> q, ¬q intr. &
2:04
¬ p ____________________intr. ¬ 3-5
In words: the premises are 'not q' and 'p follows from q'; hypothesize p, q from which derived, but among the conditions c 'is not q, then I get the contradiction by introducing the conjunction q and not q. Having obtained a contradiction from the assumption p, I can easily infer the validity of its negation.
From what has been said it can be concluded that a contradiction due to the general syntactic form and we derive the negation of which resulted in or, if there is, the denial of one or more premises considered some (actually not just a simple example to demonstrate this and it would take further explanation, but in this context is not necessary to enter and dwell on the merits in purely technical matters). If by some dogmatic propositions of the Christian religion derive contradictions, then the answer denying the truth of one or more sentences that and have generated. The fundamental problem is that for any theologian, a After the emergence of a body of dogmatic contradictions, there is no particular reason for rejecting a dogma rather than another.
To explain this we must use the definition of truth given by Tarski's schema: T-schema:
Vη η
or "η a proposition is true if and only if η", which is to say that η is real because things are just as η says. If I said "the pen on the table "I would say the real thing without a doubt, because actually the exact moment I utter this statement is that a pen on the table, and everyone, in principle, could verify this.
The reason the theologian of embarrassment in front of a contradiction dogmas
is clear: there is no reason to reject a proposition rather than another simply because that there is no consideration of these propositions in the state of affairs of the factual reality. The truth of a statement (a synonym for 'proposition' in this context) that correspond to any state of things in reality can not be alleged. The theologian, for his absolutist approach, want to keep all the dogmas in the block, on the other hand, the contradictions are obvious, and since there is no way to determine where it is
Error , is forced to attack the flawed logic of judging before God
<—―>
2 -
V (
δ) & F (δ)
namely: "a proposition δ is either true or false while "those responsible for the contradiction are the powers of truth and falsehood. Note that while this principle is undeniable: (a) F (a) V (
¬ a)
("a is false if and only if it is not true-a"), you can not say the same about this one:
(b) V (¬ a)
¬ V (a)
("not-a is true if and only if it is non- a true "). <—―> For (a), writing "¬ V (a)" amount to "F (a), ie the falsity of a, m
to some do not recognize this equality, and prefer to keep
expression
untruth,
underlining its <—―>
irreducibility to the concept of falsity
. The third type is that metaphysical 3 - ∃ x ∃ P (P (x) & ¬ P (x)) In other words, "the same object is and is not P" or "did not have the property P". This form of contradiction has generated a lot of mistakes in ancient philosophy, with important legacies in the Middle Ages. An example is the philosophy of Parmenides: he thought that, since objects in time acquired property contradictory to each other, then had to be unreal. The fact that John was young and his hair is bald from old shows to Parmenides that the body of John is unreal because contradictory (and has no hair). This error will present itself as such in Plato, who had taken a lot from Parmenides. It 'so important to emphasize that to have a real contradiction that metaphysics must be a certain property owned and does not belong to an object the same time
. This is also true for a semantic contradiction: if I say "are 21.03" Indeed in the instant of utterance, but the false statement would become in just after the 21:03, it is absurd to derive a contradiction, because truth and falsity are in different times and never together.
We come to the last form of contradiction, that psychological and pragmatic, which is more problematic in other
reference sce state of belief individuals. Occurs in two forms:
x δ that "the individual accepts δ x and δ refuses.
From (4a) and (4b) we can infer two psychological principles of non-pragmatic contradiction: (nec) ¬
(
x ¬ δ) (NCB) ¬
( at the same time,
or believe one thing and its opposite at the same time
.
For the sake of accuracy I must admit that this is not an absolute principle, as we are taught in psychology, a unique type of logic (or one thing or its opposite) is invalid in a particular environment as
may be that unconscious. However, the principle involved here addresses the individual as it appears in its outward appearance, characterized by its actions (pragmatic context) and its baggage of beliefs (psychology) , and in such a context, it is categorically impossible for a person simultaneously accepting and rejecting the same thing.
However there may be cases where an individual has contradictory beliefs;
is an eventuality that may arise when he is unaware of the incompatibility of their beliefs.
For example, to stay in theme:
God's omniscience (n) results in its non-omnipotence (
¬ t
) the omnipotence of God (t) results in its non-omniscience ( ¬ n) ; John (g) believes that God is omnipotent; John believes that God is omniscient.
The situation can be formalized:
n -> ¬ t t
->
¬ n
unknowingly into two psychological contradictions pragmatic he . Fact:
n __________________credenza t belief __________________ n ->
¬ t _____________ ignored t ->
-
¬ n _____________ ignored _________________modus ponens ¬ t 1 and 3
-
t & t ¬ _____________ _ intr. & 2 and 5; CONTRADICTION ¬ n ________________ modus ponens from 2:04
-
n & n ¬
-
_____________intr. & 1 and 7; CONTRADICTION
This explains why the principle of non-contradiction pragmatic psychology is not valid a priori, but only of thumb: the individual must be put in a position to explain the contradiction, otherwise it
- remains
-
implicit knowledge of the subject . must then deal with the obstinacy of those who, faced with a contradiction persists in believing. Such a person will try every means to discredit those who commit the unmasking ("caged you have the reality with the logic", "you are a sophist!") Or, on the contrary, detract from, considering not able to refute such a logical approach , convincing, moreover, that there must be an answer, even if you can not see. The Catholic
-
informed of the contradictory aspects of its dogmas, most likely will continue to believe, and is free to do so, the point is that his intellectual honesty does not go beyond that of those who believe that the snow is with white non-white. In the grounds of Christians who persist to "have faith"
-
while being aware of the arguments that demonstrate the inconsistency of their dogmatic system there is nothing rational; they do not seek the truth or are interested in knowing, but
s
ono willing to believe only in what is more convenient and congenial.
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