Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Funny Quotes About Losing Your Hair?

human logic and divine logic

The most popular response to the contradictions of theists made emerge from the attributes of God:

(a) is our human logic, and can make mistakes, so the contradictions are not shown to be reliable.
First it should be noted that for centuries the logic has been developed thanks to studies of theologians who considered the only way to get an understanding of God or the demonstration of its existence, the origins of this attitude are to be found in Pythagoras and all his successors, where mathematics was inextricably fused with religious mysticism.
But leaving aside these historical observations, we can say something about the logic to respond to the argument in terms of surface (a).

Thanks to Darwin today we know that our mind has evolved over time in particular we need to keep in mind that nature ensures high efficiency. Rationality is precisely what allows us to have a true vision of reality as far as possible, and allow survival.

The logic is nothing more than the formal explanation of the rational processes of the mind. So, knowing that rationality adheres to reality and that logic is the explication of rationality, we can safely conclude that the logic is consistent with reality. At this point, you have two problems: (1) when I speak of logic, a logic which I refer? (2) the logic is truly able to represent every rational process? Response (1): I refer to all known logic, because each is preferable to the other depending on context. Answer (2): the logic fails to capture nuances of natural language, both spoken and written, but we can admit, I think without problems, it includes all the basic atomic processes of reasoning.

He showed that the logic is a good way to analyze and understand the reality. But the error, some theologians say, is in applying it to God it does not work with.

To answer (a), we can divide the metaphysical reality in three worlds: Realms of existence, the realm of ideas and the Kingdom of God The use of "existing" is here distinct from "being" is understood as that which may be exercised by the senses. Being encompasses everything, including that of which there can be no experience; admit this domain in the realm of ideas, they belong to the mathematical ideas and arguments of all predicates and all propositions expressible in the languages, and a hypothetical Kingdom of God Let w1 = realms of existence, the realm of ideas = w2, w3 = Kingdom of God We know from the theology that God is the Creator of the universe, and therefore of w1, but if you created the whole ' existing, will also being led at least all the truths of mathematics, geometry and logic, as is consistent with w2 w1, w2, therefore, God has created. Finally, you can learn from w1 w2, w3, but not. Now, let's point of view of w3, we realize that God has designed the other two worlds by running them with the same logic, given that he has implanted it in the universe and w2, and considering that, in accordance with the believers God has spoken to humanity through the sacred texts, we can deduce that also applies the same logic w3 w1 and w2. But, for (a), w3 could be worth a few more unknowable logic (let's call l3).

Following Kripke semantics, this can be represented by three sets corresponding to each world w, w2 with w1 looking, looking w1 w2, w1 and w3 watching himself watching himself and the other two worlds. The sets will be limited to contain only those elements as a logical function within the world. Formalizing:

wn ↔ ln ln ε is the set of all logical coherent wn. W = {w1, w2, w3}; R = {(w1, w2) (w2, w1), (w3, w3), (w1, w1), (w3, w2) (w3, w1 )}; U = {l1, l3}; I (l1, w1) = V i (l1, w2) = V i (l1, w3) = V I (l3, w3) = V

It follows that, from our point of view, w1, the logic that we know (ie, l1) is valid in every world, and therefore it is necessary: \u200b\u200b

(W, R, I), w1 │ = L LL1

'all the logic contained in l1 are therefore indispensable, even if w1 w3 can look with the addition of the ordered pair (w1, w3) to the set R. Considering now (a) shall apply to the situation created, we are implicitly told that certain propositions as true l3 shows that l1 (putting aside the epistemic logic, since we are talking about God) are contradictory, and false: L1 and L3 systems are in conflict and can not coexist in the same world w. If incorporates l3 l1, l3 is then inconsistent, because it exists at least one theorem that its negation can be derived as a theorem. In particular, (W, R, I), w1 = │ ⌐ ML3

So there are only two possibilities: l1 our logic is absolute for all possible worlds, including w3, and there is no logical alternative l3; God has placed in the worlds w2 and w1 l1 logic, who knows but that does not obey, instead responds to a logic l3 unknowable and incompatible with our logic l1.

In the case of the truth of (1), the consequences would be devastating for the privileged world w3, and contradictions that the logic points in the attributes of God such as to be able to destroy the very concept. By the theorem of potential non-uniqueness of God as set out in the previous chapter, there would be as likely to have one God or gods infinite, if one were to accept his omnipotence, further, or is omniscient or is free, or is omniscient omnipotent, or is infinitely good or omnipotent. The contradictions are so numerous and intertwined that their resolution would lead to a concept very different from what is generally meant by God, so much different from not being classified as such (assuming omnipotence, omniscience and infinite goodness are the basic features for a divinity).

accepting (2) however, we can see that from the point of view of logic as w1 l3 is inconsistent and meaningless (because it makes true propositions contradictory to each other). Then l1 is necessarily true in all possible worlds, but only in those accessible from w1. Since L1 is incompatible with l3 and w3 can not be reached either by or from w1 w2 from w1 and w2 w3 no sense and it is not possible to say anything. But if on w3 can not say anything, then you can not even say what it is and what God has attributes, nor whether there. So even accepting (2) the classical concept of God is to refuse. "On what you can not speak, thereof one must be silent, "he wrote at the conclusion of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

Monday, November 29, 2010

What Is Baralgin Good For

God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, uniqueness

the classical theological tradition supports the following propositions simultaneously :

(1)

God is omnipotent and

(2)

God is omniscient and

(3)

God is good, where "Good" with a capital letter stands for "infinitely good". These three assumptions it can add one:


(0)

There is only one God

are numerous confirmations in the text sacred

When Abram was ninety-nine years, the Lord appeared to him and said, "I am God Almighty

: walk before me and be blameless. (Genesis

17:1)

Do you know how the clouds hover in the air, the wonders of one who knows everything? (Job 37:16

)

good and right and the Lord, our God is merciful . (Psalms 115:5

)










For the Lord your God is a merciful God

; not abandon you and do not destroy thee, nor forget the covenant which he swore to your fathers. (
Deuteronomy 4:31)















But

one who knows everything, knows it and has scrutinized by intelligence. It is he who shall turn in times ruled the earth and filled it in animals. (Baruch 3:32

)






not multiply the speeches arrogant, arrogance does not come out of your mouth, because the Lord is the God who knows everything and his works are governed. (1 Samuel 2:3 )

have no other god but me. (Exodus 20:3) The term "omnipotent" means "anything that can, and can be attributed only to God (from dictionary), so anything imaginable can be made by God ( if someone believes that "anything" is not synonymous with "every conceivable thing," you can now reads: "at least every conceivable thing can be done by God," because in this case "everything thinkable" is a subset just "whatever"). At this point, postulating that (PA) there is a single entity called God of which (to borrow the terminology of St. Anselm) nothing can be more: (PA) ∃ x [R & (

∃ z (z> x) & (y) (Dy

x = y))]

with D: "to be God."

for "greatest of all Board" means the entity that possesses all perfections, and intuitively, perfection is a desirable property the highest degree. Here is revealed with clarity throughout the arbitrariness on which the Saint Anselm's definition of God: the preferability implies, for example, feel better goodness to evil, life or death, but this requires a human to judge subjectively the best that can be said - namely, what is best for the judging

. And the fact that some people deem it preferable property does not mean that God possesses. The same

Gödel, in his "mathematical proof of the existence of God," warns the problem, and speaks of "positive properties." However the issue remains unchanged: we have no yardstick to determine objectively as possible which property can be said and what is not positive, once again, the only yardstick is the human one, returning the properties to the same positive refutation of property preferable. But what is puzzling is what a property could ever be "the highest degree." It might be expected that all properties are crystallized into archetypes, and the objects according to the hierarchical proximity to these archetypes. Give now, mo 'for example, any color, brown. In nature there are various shades of brown, but no one can say with certainty Brown, it can happen then apply an agreement through which it is determined that "this here is brown. From that point on, you can prioritize all the bodies because of their proximity to the archetype established, which is brown in the highest degree. But what is considered "maximum", "archetype" has been established arbitrarily, that is, by men.

In summary, to say that God possesses all perfections support means that only the properties that people prefer and the way you determine which, euphemistically, is not very persuasive. a ploy to stem the problem is to consider the properties

eminentiori

sensu (ie extended indefinitely), instead of "the highest degree." This will replace an unacceptable arbitrariness with something that no one understands the meaning, but justified by the fact that God is beyond human cognitive faculties. So, for example, well, controversial concept in itself, in God is an infinite good - even more controversial.

But now, flying over the property sull'inaccettabilità positive or preferable, let's assume that God exists.

We know it can do anything you can imagine by virtue of his omnipotence. So it could be a dog or a plant. There are consequences more fatal, which would lead to absurd logic, such as the fact that

(a)

God can not be himself or

(b)

institution can create a "greater than he" (meaning Anselmo). To grasp the absurdity in all its glory, note the formalization of (a):

(a) ∃ x (Dx & (Y) (Dy




M
Dy & x = y))


with M = modal operator of possibility. For (b) applies instead: (b)
∃ x [R & (y) (z) (Dy


MCyz & x = y & z> x)]

where C = "create an entity".

A theologian may rightly place the emphasis on the operator is not truth-functional M: in fact this is only possible, and God could not do it. Theology tells us that in reality

(1st) exercise the omnipotence of God as an act of will

or whatever God wants he can do. Meanwhile, by (b) we note that there is at least the possibility that there is an even greater authority of God himself, call 2 God, but God 2, being greater than God, is even more powerful, and will certainly create a God 3, and so on to infinity. So we have an infinite number of potentials. So (b1) is possible that God exists at least one of n-th level created by one God of level n-1. This is a generalization of (b):
(b1) M ∃ x [D x & n y (n-1 D & y (z) (n-1 D z SXZ & y = z & ⌐
x = y))]


= S "being created by".

Since humans can not know when and how God exercises his will (from (1a)), for (b1) we must correct the theologians and say that there is at least a God who could have created (not just more of him: divine entities may also create less than or equal to itself, resulting in a similar pantheon that described by the currents and the Gnostic Corpus Hermeticum):

(TNU) Theorem to potential non-uniqueness of God :

∃ x (Dx & MGxx)

where G = "create more institutions, equal to or less than."


The (TNU) contradicts the assumption (0): If God is omnipotent, we must admit that may not be the only God, but if we admit the uniqueness at all costs, we must recognize that may not be omnipotent.

But is not the only contradiction. We can ask if (1) God is able to do things that he himself does not know: if he can do it, then it is not omniscient, if it can not omnipotent. Even if such action would be potential omniscience would be compromised, since it would ignore the possibility.
Finally, the character of omnipotence includes the possibility of evil actions (this argument is known for millennia and has been properly resolved in different ways, with important modifications of the concept of God and Amalric, and Schelling), but from (3) we know that God is infinitely good, then God can not do evil. The fact remains that could do it as a possibility: but this is impossible, since God is essentially good. Since the Good can not do evil even in power, God can not do evil even in power. Therefore God is infinitely good, or is or omnipotent.